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bility and validity in non-criminal proceedings or the extension of the
Court's reasoning into other areas of privilege, the implications of the
ruling are important when viewed in the context of the growth of execu-
tive power in the American system. In addition, serious weaknesses
in the Nixon test pose difficult problems for those who will apply it in
future cases. What is called for in response to the decision is extreme
presidential circumspection in asserting the privilege, as well as con-
tinued, responsible review by the courts. Hopefully, such judicious
exercise of power will prevent executive privacy from degenerating into
a convenient instrument for concealing from the public what it has a
right to know.
H. KING MCGLAUGHON, JR.
Constitutional Law-Lowering the Compelling State Interest
Hurdle
During the twelve years since its decision in Baker v. Carr,' the
Supreme Court has considered numerous challenges to state election
laws raised by potential voters and candidates. 2 In ruling upon these
challenges, the Court has developed an exacting standard to be applied
in determining whether a state's restrictions on the right to vote violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Because
of the stringency of this standard, which requires a state to justify its
restrictions by showing their necessity to further a "compelling" state
interest,4 many state laws regulating voter qualifications and candidacy
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In this landmark, legislative apportionment case, the
Court extended equal protection to nonracial challenges of state election statutes. Note,
Oregon v. Mitchell and the Compelling State Interest Doctrine-The End of an Era?,
22 SYRwcusn L. Rav. 1123, 1125 (1971). In so extending the equal protection clause,
the Court "substantially modified the constitutional matrix in this area." 30 O-o ST.
L.J 202 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419
(1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
3. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), in which
the Court justified its imposition of this new test as follows: "This careful examination
is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our
representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may partici-
pate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government." Id, at 626,
4. Id. at 627,
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requirements have been declared unconstitutional.5 In the recent case
of Storer v. Brown,6 however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a portion of the California Eleotion Code7 concerning inde-
pendent candidates.8  In upholding these statutes, the Court ostensibly
applied the compelling state interest test;9 however, an examination of
the majority opinion reveals that the Court aotually applied a standard
much closer to that of the traditional equal protection test that is
normally reserved for cases in which neither fundamental rights nor
suspect classifications are involved.' 0 When viewed in light of other
recent franchise opinions," the Storer decision indicates the Court's
willingness to give state legislatures greater latitude in enacting elec-
toral restrictions and to ease the states' burdens in meeting challenges
to these laws.
The Storer case arose out of the 1972 California elections in which
plaintiffs Storer, Frommhagen, Hall, and Tyner sought to be placed on
the ballot as independent candidates in 'the general election. Storer
and Frommhagen, who both desired to run for Congress from their
respective districts, were denied ballot access because they had been
affiliated with the Democratic Party within a year prior to the 1972
primary,'2 thereby failing to meet one of the requirements for indepen-
dent candidacy prescribed by California law.' 3 Plaintiffs Hall and
5. See, e.g., cases cited note 2 supra.
6. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Id. at 755.
7. CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 6830-31, 6833 (West Supp. 1974).
8. 415 U.S. at 736.
9. Id.: see American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974).
10. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) Chief Justice Warren ex-
plained the traditional equal protection test as follows:
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enact-
ing laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it.
Id. at 425-26. For a discussion of the development of the two equal protection standards
and the distinctions between them see Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age
Statute, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 1, 28-32 (1970).
11. E.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 535 (1974) (Blackmun & Rehnquist,
J.J., dissenting); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), aff'g
inem. 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
12. 415 U.S. at 728.
1 3. CAr. Et. COqDE 6830 (West Supp. 1974), which governs independent ca-
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Tyner, who desired to run for President and Vice-President of the
United States,' 4 complied with the above party disaffiliation require-
ment, but were denied ballot access because of their failure to meet
the requirements concerning the submission of nominating petitions."1
Thus the four potential candidates brought actions in federal district
court challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of the California
Election Code regulating independent candidates' access to the ballot.'6
A three-judge district court dismissed the complaints, concluding
that the statutes "served a sufficiently important state interest to sustain
their constitutionality."'1 7 On direct appeal, 18 a divided Supreme Court
upheld the provisions requiring one year of disaffiliation.' 9 In doing
so, the Court concluded that the requirement furthered "the State's
interest in the stability of its political system"-an interest the Court
found to be compelling. This note will examine the manner in which
the Court evaluated the disaffiliation requirement and the nature and
extent of its departure from the previously developed compelling state
interest test.
Before evaluating the Court's opinion, it is necessary to examine
didates, provides in part:
Each candidate or group of candidates shall file a nomination paper which
shall contain:
(c) A statement that the candidate and each signer of his nomination pa-
per did not vote at the immediately preceding primary election at which a can-
didate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper ...
(d) A statement that the candidate is not, and was not at any time during
the one year preceding the immediately preceding primary election at which
a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper,
registered as affiliated with a political party ....
14. Hall and Tyner were members of the Communist Party, which had failed to
qualify for ballot status under California law. They therefore sought to run as inde-
pendent candidates. 415 U.S. at 728.
15. The Court summarized these requirements as follows:
The independent candidate must . . . file nomination papers signed by no less
than 5% nor more than 6% of the entire vote cast in the preceding general
election in the area for which the candidate seeks to run. § 6831. All of these
signatures must be obtained during a 24-day period following the primary and
ending 60 days prior to the general election, § 6833, and none of the signatures
may be gathered from persons who vote at the primary election. § 6830(c).
Id. at 726-27.
16. Id. They argued that the statutes violated their first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights.
17. Id. at 728.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) authorizes an appeal directly to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of a three-judge district court concerning the constitutionality of a state
law. ;
19. The Court remanded the cases of Hall and Tyner, instructing the district court
to determine from prior election data that was unavailable to the Court whether the pe-
tition requirements placed an unconstitutional burden on independents seeking positions
on the ballot. 415 U.S. at 738-40.
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briefly the franchise cases out of which the compelling state interest
test evolved.20  Its development may be viewed in three phases."' In
the cases constituting the initial phase,22 the Court articulated the im-
portance of the right to vote23 and asserted that a state's abridgment
of this right should be examined very carefully.24  By the time of its
decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,25 a majority of the
Court was on the verge of expressing a new equal protection standard
to be applied in voting rights cases.
The articulation of this new test occurred during the second phase.
In Williams v. Rhodes26 the Court made clear that, although a state had
the authority to enact laws regulating elections, this grant of authority
was not absolute; it could not be exercised in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause.2 7  The Court then listed the following factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether an election statute is unconstitutional:
20. Prior to the mid-1960's, the Court had applied the concepts of the equal protec-
tion clause to two types of cases: those involving commercial regulations, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960), and those in which racially discrim-
inatory state action was alleged, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
The Court applied two different equal protection standards in evaluating statutes, its
choice depending upon the type of classification involved. In commercial regulation
cases, the Court determined whether the statute rationally promoted a legitimate state
interest. The state's interest was presumed to be legitimate unless the classifications
were shown to be arbitrary. Note, 22 Sm.cusE L. Rav., supra note 1. Because this
traditional standard allowed important individual rights to be subordinated to less impor-
tant state interests, the Court applied a more stringent standard when racial classifica-
tions were involved. Because of their "suspect" classifications, these statutes were pre-
sumed illegitimate unless "shown to be absolutely free of any purpose which might en-
courage 'invidious discrimination."' Id. at 1125.
21. This somewhat arbitrary division is devised merely to aid in the analysis of
a large group of decisions. Admittedly it oversimplifies the process of the development
of the compelling state interest test.
22. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia's poll tax
held unconstitutional); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (Texas law prohibiting
servicemen from voting held unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(Alabama state legislative apportionment plans held unconstitutional).
23. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court stated that "[tihe right
to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society,
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." Id.
at 555. "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society." Id. at 561-62.
24. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Court said,
"We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted
under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id. at 670.
25. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
26. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). This case involved a challenge by would-be candidates
to the Ohio election laws, which, because of their stringent requirements, made it vir-
tually impossible for a third party or an independent candidate to gain access to the
ballot. Id. at 25.
27. Id. at 29.
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"the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the
State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification. ' 28  Since the "precious" rights of
voting and association were involved, the Court held that the State had
to justify its infringement of them by showing a "compelling state
interest.' '29
Because the majority in Williams rested its opinion on both first
amendment and equal protection grounds, it remained unclear whether
the Court had created a new equal protection test to be applied in fran-
chise cases. 30  Subsequent decisions removed any uncertainty. Al-
though Shapiro v. Thompson"' was not a voting rights case, the Court
stated succinctly the appropriate equal protection standard for evalu-
ating statutes abridging rights that the Court deemed to be "fundamen-
tal": "[The traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the
classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate move-
ment, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of
whether it promotes a compelling state interest."8' 2
After the compelling state interest test had been used to declare
several state election laws unconstitutional,33 the development of the
test entered its third phase14 when certain members of the Court began
to express their displeasure at the continued interference with enact-
ments of state legislatures. 35  An early example of this abandonment
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 31.
30. 30 Omo ST. L.J, supra note 1, at 215.
31. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). This case arose out of challenges to states' durational
residency requirements for welfare benefits.
32. Id. at 638. Having developed this new standard, the Court then began to ap-
ply it in cases in which state election laws were challenged. In Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969), for example, the Court expressed the
compelling state interest test in a two-step analysis. It must first be determined whether
the classifications under consideration are "tailored so that the exclusion of appellant
and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal." If they
are so tailored, then the Court must determine whether that goal constitutes a compel-
ling state interest. Id. at 632 n.14.
33. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (Tennessee durational residency
requirements for voting held unconstitutional); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
(Texas filing fee system held unconstitutional). Other cases in which the Court applied
this standard in evaluating election laws include, City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970) (Arizona law permitting only real property taxpayers to vote on issu-
ance of general obligation bonds held unconstitutional); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419 (1970) (Maryland law denying franchise to residents of federal enclaves within the
state held unconstitutional); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)
(Louisiana law restricting franchise in certain elections to those who paid taxes on real
property held unconstitutional).
34. This phase overlaps the previous one.
. See, e.g., Dunn v, Blvmstein, 495 W.$. 330, 363 (1972) (Burger, C.J, disspnt-
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of the stringent standard was the Court's affirmance, by a five to four
vote, of the district court decision in Lippitt v. Cipollone.3" The
majority accepted without opinion the standard applied below, which
clearly was less demanding than the compelling state interest test.37
More recently in Rosario v. Rockefeller" -the majority applied a
standard that, according to the dissent, resembled "the traditional
'rational basis' test."' 9  Both of these cases were relied on by the
majority in its decision in Storer,40 which should also be included in
this third phase.
In analyzing -the Storer decision, it first must be determined
whether, under the facts of the case, the application of the compelling
state interest test was required. Although the Court has never classi-
ing), in which the Chief Justice termed the compelling state interest test "seemingly in-
surmountable." Id. at 363-64. In the very recent case of O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S.
524, 535 (1974) (Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting), Justice Blackmun expressed
his dissatisfaction as follows: "I would refrain from continued tampering and interfer-
ence with the details of state election laws. If details are deserving of cure, the State's
legislature, not this Court, ought to be the curative agent." Id. at 537.
36. 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), affg mem. 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971). This
case upheld Ohio's statute which specified that candidates in party primaries could not
have voted in another party's primary within the four previous years.
A similar retreat by the Court from its application of the compelling state interest
test occurred in equal protection challenges in other areas. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (California Water Code
provision restricting voting rights in water district general elections to landowners and
apportioning votes according to land value upheld); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (Oregon judicial procedure for evicting non-paying tenants upheld); Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (West Virginia requirement of sixty percent voter approval
for incurring public debts or increasing tax rates upheld); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland law setting maximum for welfare grants upheld).
It has been suggested, and the Court's approaches in the above cases and in Storer
add credence to the suggestion, that in recent years the Court has moved away from
a rigid dual-pronged equal protection approach. Rather than choosing either the tradi-
tional, rational basis test or the stringent, compelling state interest test, the Court has
begun to employ a standard lying somewhere between the two extremes. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
37. The district court stated that the state legislature is presumed to have acted
constitutionally; Lippitt v. Cipollone, 337 F. Supp. 1405, 1406 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd
mem., 404 U.S. 1032 (1972); a presumption that is rejected under the compelling state
interest test. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
38. 410 U.S. 752 (1973). The Court upheld a provision of the New York Elec-
tion Code that restricted primary voting to those whose party affiliation had been regis-
tered at least thirty days before the previous general election (i.e. eleven months prior
to the non-presidential primary).
39. Id. at 767 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority's opinion seems to support
this conclusion because the Court affirmed the statute upon finding that the restriction
was "tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or arbi-
trary." Id. at 762. The "invidious" or "arbitrary" test is traditionally applied in cases
involving economic regulation. See note 20 supra.
40. 415 U.S. at 734, 736.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fled candidacy per se as a fundamental right,41 it has recognized that
the rights of candidates and those of voters often overlap.42 Thus an
infringement of candidates' rights that also affects those of voters
requires the application of the compelling state interest test .4  The
majority's nominal use of the compelling state interest test in Storer '
suggests that there was sufficient infringement of voters' rights here to
require a close scrutiny. As the Court itself stated in Lubin v. Panish,'
decided the same day as Storer, "Mhe right to vote is 'heavily
burdened' if that vote may be cast only for one of -two candidates in
a primary election at a time when other candidates are clamoring for
a place on the ballot. '46  Similarly, the rights of a significant group of
voters are "heavily burdened" when the number of independent can-
didates is limited.
Although the Court recognized the necessity of applying the com-
pelling state interest test in Storer, it departed from its own guidelines
established in earlier cases in applying that test. One of the funda-
mental aspects of the test is the state's burden of justifying any restric-
tions on the right to vote.4 7  In the past the Court had clearly rejected
the automatic presumption of legitimacy of the state action 48  and
instead had required the state to show compelling reasons for its restric-
tions.49
Despite this basic requirement, there is no indication in the Storer
opinion that the burden of justification was placed on California. On
the contrary, the Court stated that it had no reason for "concluding that
the device California chose, § 6830(d), was not an essential part of its
41. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972). But cf. Lippitt v.
Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), affg mem. 337 F. Supp.
1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
42. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
43. Id. at 144.
44. An example of the Court's use of this terminology is the following statement:
"We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweigh-
ing the interest [of] the candidate and his supporters. . . ." 415 U.S. at 736,
45. 415 U.S. 709 (1974). The Court held unconstitutional the California filing
fee requirement, which in its application prevented indigent candidates from gaining bal-
lot status. In reaching its decision, the Court found that the "[s]election of candidates
solely on the basis of ability to pay a fixed fee without providing any alternative means
[was] not reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate election
interests." Id. at 717 (emphasis added). Because of the State's complete failure to
demonstrate the necessity of its restrictions, the Court in Lubin was able to find the
statute unconstitutional under even the more tolerant standard that it applied.
46. Id. at 716.
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
48. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
49. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
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overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals." 50  Rather than
requiring the State to prove that the restriction was "necessary to
achieve its articulated state goal," 51 it accepted a lack of proof to the
contrary as sufficient. Clearly in doing so, the Court eased consider-
ably the State's task in justifying its statute.
Implicit in the Court's acceptance of the disaffiliation requirement
is its assumption that an absence of the requirement would lead to
political instability. However, the opinion referred to no data support-
ing such conclusion; thus it must be assumed that the Court was merely
speculating on the result. Under the traditional equal protection test,
such an approach by the Court is permissible.52  But under previously
enumerated guidelines, the compelling state interest ,test prohibits such
speculation; mere theoretical problems do not justify infringements of
individual rights.
53
The Court's discussion of the rationale behind the disaffiliation
requirement displays other ways in which it departed from past guide-
lines.54 In prior decisions the Court had required "exacting stand-
ard[s] of precision" in statutes affecting voting rights.55  Those
statutes, which contained sweeping exclusions of a large number of citi-
zens for reasons that were valid for only a segment of that group,
were declared unconstitutional.56 Here, however, the Court said that
one of the justifications of the disaffiliation requirement was that it pro-
tected against "candidacies prompted by short-range political goals,
pique or personal quarrel. 57 The Court failed to consider that in ex-
cluding those types of candidacies, the statute also excludes those
prompted by a desire for public service and a belief that the partisan
candidates fail to represent adequately the viewpoints of a significant
group of voters.
50. 415 U.S. at 73 (emphasis added).
51. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
52. Under this less stringent standard, "the Court may even engage in speculation
to find some possible justification for the state law." Engdahl, supra note 10, at 32.
53. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968).
54. The Court stated the reasons for the disaffiliation requirement as follows:
It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent can-
didates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternate
course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by
short-range political goals, pique or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial
barrier to a party fielding an "independent" candidate to capture and bleed off
votes in the general election that might well go to another party.
415 U.S. at 735.
55. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
56. See, e.g., id. at 351; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
57. 415 U.S. at 735.
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As the Court stated in Storer and had earlier stated in Williams
v. Rhodes,5 8 among the factors to be considered in evaluating a statute
under the compelling state interest test are "the facts and circumstances
behind the law." 9 In prior decisions the Court had included practical
political considerations among the circumstances that it considered.
Thus in Williams it noted that Ohio's early petition deadline was at odds
with the constantly changing nature of American politics.Y0 In Storer,
however, the Court completely disregarded the disaffiliation require-
ment's relationship to political realities."' By omitting this considera-
tion the Court failed to evaluate fully the extent of the impact of the
requirement upon potential independent candidates.
The final and perhaps most striking departure of the Court from
its past decisions was its failure to consider the availability of less
burdensome means of achieving the State's objectives. Under the tra-
ditional equal protection test, a legislature has great latitude in enacting
regulations, as long as they are rationally related to the state's objec-
tives.6" But under the compelling state interest test, there are further
limitations on the legislature's authority. As the Court stated in Dunn
v. Blumstein, 3 even if a state is attempting to achieve a legitimate in-
terest, it cannot "unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally pro-
tected activity."64  The Court stated further: "[I]f there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitu-
tionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater
interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' "05 In
contrast, while Storer stated that California was not required to choose
ineffectual means to further its interests, 6 it failed -to require California
to show that there were no effective, but less burdensome, means avail-
able. This failure is especially significant in light of the Court's state-
ment that "[a] State need not take the course California has.167  Hav-
58. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
59. 415 U.S. at 730, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
60. See 393 U.S. at 33. The Court explained that the identity of those opposed
to the candidates and policies of the major parties often could not be determined until
shortly before the election.
61. As the dissent noted, this requirement meant that a party member would have
to realize seventeen months before an election that he desired to run as an independent
candidate. Accordingly, he would have to take action at a time when the potential
nominees of the two major parties would probably be unknown. 415 U.S. at 758.
62. Engdahl, supra note 10, at 29.
63. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
64. Id. at 343.
65. Id.
66. 415 U.S. at 736.
67. Id. North Carolina, for example, is not noted for its political instability or
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ing implied that some states achieved political stability by other means,
the Court should have inquired into the nature of these alternatives.
By not requiring the State to utilize less drastic means, the Court went
a step further in increasing the latitude of the legislature's authority.
The significance of the Storer decision lies in its implications for
future franchise cases. It suggests that, when election laws that do not
directly and blatantly infringe the rights of voters are challenged, the
Court will lower the justification hurdle that the state must surmount.
As a result, it is likely that the Court will approve electoral restrictions
that accomplish indirectly what it was previously declared could not be
done directly. The Storer decision indicates particularly that when
candidacy restrictions are involved, the Court will apply a more lenient
standard of evaluation. Such an approach by the Court seems unwise,
for little has been gained if a soldier in Texas 6s or an indigent in Vir-
ginia69 is allowed into the voting booth only to discover that those candi-
dates representing his point of view have been excluded from the bal-
lot. James Madison recognized this critical relationship between rights
of candidates and those of voters when he said, "A republic may be
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy, as well by limiting the num-
ber capable of being elected as the number authorized to elect."' "°
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON
Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section
1983 Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities
In developing satisfactory judicial approaches to the section 1983
remedies of the Civil Rights Act,1 federal courts have encountered con-
its high degree of interparty raiding, and yet it places no requirement of prior disaffilia-
tion on independent candidates. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122 (Supp. 1973), a
potential independent candidate must file an affidavit stating that he "does not affiliate
with any political party" (emphasis added). There is no further requirement that he
must not have affiliated with a party at any time in the past.
68. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
69. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
70. 5 J. ELLIoT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FFDEPAL CONSTITUTION 404 (1845).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
1974] 439
